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SYMMETRIC AUCTIONS: FINDING NUMERICAL 
SOLUTIONS BY USING AUCTION SOLVER  
Dushko Josheski30
Abstract
This essay theoretically investigates symmetric types of auctions and provides simulation for the different types
of statistical distributions that bidders follow in order to determine the maximum bid, Expected revenue for the
auctioneer, Expected payment by bidders, Expected utility of the bidders, probability that item is unallocated. In
addition, the subject of interest of this paper are three types of auctions: FPA (first price auction, Dutch type,
SPA (Second price auction, English auction, Vickrey auction), APA (all-pay auctions) 
Introduction
Symmetric auctions are widely used in practice. These are types of auctions where bidders submit sealed
bids, and the highest bid is winning.31 The payments are determined as an anonymous function of bids, (Deb
&Pai 2016).Symmetric auctions are having rules, which are anonymous and non-discriminatory, which is why
they are so popular in practice, despite the fact that they do not achieve seller’s revenue maximisation when
buyers are heterogeneous. For instance, first price auctions(FPA) are more profitable than the second price
auctions (SPA) in a case of risk averse buyers and when risk aversion coefficient is higher the difference is
larger. So it is plausible that FPA is more profitable than SPA, (Klempeper 1999).Klemperer asserts that in
second price or ascending bid auction, winner pays a price set by a runner-up (second best), and by rev-
enue equivalence, must bid the expectation of this price in a first price auction. So the price is fixed in FPA
and random but with the same mean in SPA. This means that the price is riskier in SPA. Therefore, risk
averse seller prefers first-price auction to a second sealed-bid auction, and prefers the second price sealed-
bid auction to an ascending open auction.  
30) Dushko Josheski, PhD Assistant professor, University Goce Delcev-Shtip, +389(75)954602, dushkojosheski@gmail.com 
Subject to being greater than reservation bid. 
31) Subject to being greater than reservation bid. 
Interactions between markets and institutions-The case of auctions 
McAfee and McMillan (1987), define auctions as market institutions with an explicit set of rules that are deter-
mining resource allocation and prices on a basis of bids from the market participants. 
On the other hand institutions are rules that define conditions by which market messages (offers, demands,
and accepts) are being traded, and lead to allocation of resources and process, (Smith2001).If in the econ-
omy there exist n agents , i.e. i = 1,2 .... n and each of them chooses a message µi, than the allocation of
the resources xi towards agent i is defined as :
Equation 1
xi = η (m1, m2,.... mi,.....mn)
In the previous expression η are the rules of allocation. Rules of allocation are institutionally defined rules.
As an example one can take auctions and their rules. Let’s suppose that bidder i outs a highest bid.  In such
case following applies:
Equation 2
xi = η (m1> mi > mn) = 1, xk = 0; ∀k ≠ 1
In this case m1 is the highest bid, and agent i = 1 puts a highest bid. Henceforth, agent 1 will win the auc-
tion. At first when agent 1 will make the bid, nobody knows who will win the lot (An item or set of items for
sale in an auction). But the other on-site bidders know, that none of the other k agents will not like to raise
the bid, so that the rules of the institution tell us that x1 = 1 and xk = 0. Some of the most successful inter-
net auction houses such as eBay and Amazon are using second price auctions, by which bidder with high-
est bid will win the lot., but pays a price equal to the small increment (growth) on top of a second highest bid.
On-site bidder can offer and “reserve price”, which is a maximum price and which is used to compete the
others with prices. Some auction houses such as eBay have fixed closing time, while on Amazon closing
time is continued as long as few minutes pass without bid (ten minutes on Amazon). In the eBay type of auc-
tion model there exist n bidders, i = 1,2,...n. Minimal offer is m (reserve price), and the least increment
is ζ, which is assumed to be constant.32 Reserve price should be higher than the current price , and the last
reserve price (“Hammer price”) established by the last bidder, i.e. bidder cannot lower its last reserve price
which was set, (Оckenfels&Roth 2003). Highest reserve price is not revealed. Auction history shows the last
price and shows the time when price was put by the bidder. Auctioneer can bid at any time t ∈ [0,1] U 1.
Reaction time of other bid of second bidder t ’ < 1. Earliest time of reaction is set with tn and tn > t ’, and is
close to one, and so t ’ < tn > 1. On the eBay auctions there are no dominant strategies. Bid caller (auction-
eer), in this auctions can pay some value vj, distributed by some known distribution.
33 Auctioneer who will
win the auction with some price p, earn the difference between the price he likes to pay, and the price that
actually wins the auction vj - p, auctioneer who does not won, does not gets zero. In the eBay auctions that
are second price of the auctioneer type of auctions not with private value auctions vj,  there are no dominant
strategies vj >m+ζ. The number of auctioneers is 2, i = 2, and by assumption if i > 2, other auctioneers
do not auction. There is no dominant strategy for the player j who has value vj >m+ζ, which is best
response for any strategy of the player j, which is the best response to any strategy of the player i. Let’s
suppose that the strategy, i, is to set minimal bid m when t = 0, i.e. at the beginning of the auction, and to
bid furthermore always when there is highest bid, but if he is not the auctioneer with the highest bid than he
will set bid b > vj +ζ. Contrary to this strategy, best response of the player j is not to bid at any time peri-
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∂ζ
32)  i.e. , -----= c, where, c is constant.∂ρ
33) This strategy for value which the player could bid immediately applies only for the beginning of the auction, or in any time
between the beginning and the end of the auction.
od, t < 1, and not to bid vj when t = 1. Result from this strategy for player j, p (vj - m - ζ ) > 0, which
means that no other strategy when t = 1 cannot contribute to higher result to j. But, if we assume that the
strategy of the player i is not to bid in any of the times offered, than the strategy of the player i who answers
the bid only when t = 1, that will provide him  the expected result p (vj - m) < vj - m, which is a result
that j could achieve from the strategies offered vj when t = 0, or at any given period of time when t < 1.
Best strategy for the player i is p (vj - m - ζ ) > 0, which is a strategy of player j, because best strategy
of j was not to bid if t ≠ 0. Consequently, this is a proof that there is no dominant strategy. In a standard
auction model of the eBay institution, it has been specified minimal opening bid, but not the price, which is
a seller’s reserve price. Seller can choose public bid but also additional reserve price below which he can-
not sell. In the previous example reserve price is lower so that the post-sale negotiation be avoided.34
First price auction (sealed first bid auction strategically equivalent to Dutch auctions)
In this auction scheme each buyer submits a bid b ≥ 0 for the object. The bids are sealed, and no bidder
has information about the bids of other opponents. The object is allocated to the bidder with the highest bid.
Highest bidder pays the bid; other bidders pay nothing. Variance in the Dutch auctions is 
For the Dutch type of auctions variance of price is:
Equation 3
In the Dutch model of auction, buyers gain is v - p = v -                  , where v is the highest drawn value,
range of possible gains is from 0 to    . While, in the English type of auction gain could vary from 0 to 1,
Vickrey (1961)
Vickrey type of auction (sealed-bid)
This auction scheme is different in the one presented in (Vickrey1961), which is used by Google and Yahoo
in their on-line advertisement programs. Vickrey (1961) auction scheme, is different from the type of scheme
of proxy auctions on eBay, by the fact that bids are not closed, i.e. current highest bid35 is always public. In
Vickrey type of auction, bidders submit their bids sealed, without knowing other members in the auction bids,
and in this type of auction highest bid wins, but the price paid is second highest bid. This result is Pareto
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34) On this way there is incentive agent not to bid above its own bid if he is the highest bid caller because of the fear reserve price
not to exceed his initial bid.
35) Current highest bid is equal to the second best bid plus increment change, i.e.  m + ζ
,
 
optimal. This auction is efficient because the winner is the auctioneer for whom the lot has highest value.
Achievement of Pareto optimal result on imperfect markets is difficult. Market imperfection in Vickrey model
is in the fact that buyers and sellers are very few in number to ignore consequences of their actions on price
but on the other hand there are not enough participants in the market in overt or tacit (collusions) market
actions. Vickrey in his model describes one marketing agency, through which all sales of goods and procure-
ments must be done. If we imagine homogenous rectangular distribution of the auction in limits 0 to 1, and
even though number of players is i > 1, 2,...n, from which for all of them there exist corresponding value
in the distribution vt and are biding one price, while probability for first n - 1 players to draw corresponding
value for them is [0, v] while the n-thplayer would draw corresponding value between [v, v + dv] = v n - 1  dv,
this value is from the value dp1 (v) = nv 
n - 1 . Price of every bid is given as                           . Expected price
in this case is given with the following expression:
Equation 4
Previous case is when one has definite integral, i.e. distribution goes from 0 to 1, and the result applies if 
n > -1, if there is unlimited distribution than the result is:
Equation 5
Probability that the second best price will be realized is        , and the probability that this price is in the inter-
val between [v, v + dv] n (n -1) v n - 2  (1-v)dv, meaning that the average price is:
Equation 6
Again expected value of the bidders is the expected value of the excess          , and the  value of lot won by
the successful bidder        . This applies for progressive type of auctions  , and for Dutch auctions.36 But the
price variance is different in both types of auctions.37 For the SPA (second price auction theory) variance is 
Equation 7
64
SYMMETRIC AUCTIONS: FINDING NUMERICAL SOLUTIONS BY USING AUCTION SOLVER 
 
                          
s  
                     
s  
s  
 
36) English auctions are such type where it is begun with lowest (reserve prices) and it is going to higher price. English auctions are
of open type.  
37) Dutch type of auction. is a type of auction, that begins with highest bid that decreases until some auctioneer does accept the
price, or accepts proposed reserve price.
Variance in the gain is even larger from Dutch to English model of auction. Revenue equivalence theorem is
a central topic in the auction theory. This theory confirms that if there are n risk neutral agents, that do inde-
pendent and personal evaluation of some auction good , and valuation follows cumulative distribution F (v),
which is ascending probability distribution of a continuous set of choices (v, v--). Than every auction mecha-
nism (every institution auction), in which lot will be allocated towards the agent for which it has highest value
v--, and every agent with a valuation of good v has utility 0, generates exact same revenue, which lead every
bidder to make the same payment. Mechanism of lot allocation taken into consideration here is following:
expected value of lot for the agent i is ui (v
--), while the probability that the agent i will win the auction is 
Pi (v
--), in the equilibrium of the auction (when the lot is saled), and afterwards it follows the agents strategy
v--, this strategy is given by a following expression:
Equation 8
This means that the utility of agent , is dependent on the average value by which he values lot, which is mul-
tiplied with the probability that he will win the auction minus the average value of agents i payment, which
he will do for the selected lot. In the equilibrium:
Equation 9
v type agent, values the lot with v - v--, more than agents v-- lot valuation. Inequality applies because the devi-
ation must be non-profit , i.e. v - v-- ≥ 0, here one it can be written that
Equation 10
v-- = v + dv
Where dv is some marginal value, and v-- value is larger than v for some marginal value. If in the previous
expression ui(v) ≥ ui(v--) + (v - v--) Pi(v--) one replaces v-- with v-- = v + dv, one could get :
Equation 11
With the rearrangement one can get:
Equation 12
Value of the utility for the agent i for v valuation, one can get as a sum of utility ui (v), plus  the sum from
probability that lot x will be allocated to him, which is equal to Pi(v
--), ie.:
Equation 13
Because there are two possible outcomes of the auction, agent wins the lot and agent does not win the lot,
(0,1), i.e. as it is said in the theorem at the beginning (v, v--), meaning that the agent of type v will never won
the game, and his utility will be zero ui (v) = 0. Furthermore, every player has equal probability that will win
the lot in the two type of auctions (English and Dutch) Pi(vi). From the equation, ui(v
--) = v-- Pi(v
--) - E(pay-
ment v--i), for the i-th agent we have   :
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Equation 14
This means that expected payoff in the two mechanisms (v, v--), is equal and amounts to E(payment vi).
Symmetric model case 
This case applies when coefficient of risk aversion is zero. Whether one chooses Constant relative risk aver-
sion (CRRA),39 or Constant absolute risk aversion (CARA),38 if the risk aversion coefficients are zero, and
reservation price (r = 0) revenue  equivalence holds. In this case expected revenue E (R), from the auc-
tionto the auctioneer is the same in the First price auction (Dutch auction) and in the Second price auction
(English auction, Vickrey type of auction). So in the case where revenue equivalence holds (risk neutral
case), utility to the bidders is:
Equation 15
U(c) = c
In the previous expression c represents consumption, and in the risk neutral case such as this bid functions
(symmetric equilibrium bid functions) are:
Equation 16
In the case of a pure strategy equilibrium, where player 1 (bidder) reveals, bidder’s valuation is common
knowledge, so the rival bidders can anticipate bid of player 1. This bid will be denoted as vo > 0, unless 
v1 = 0. Best response of the closest rival (i-th bidder) top the bidder 1 rival will be to bid as in an auction
with n - 1 bidders, and a common knowledge reserve price bo which will be equal to vo. The equilibrium
bidding strategy with n - 1 bidders and a reservation price of bo and reservation value v > bo, is given as:
40
Equation 17
bo< v < 1 or zero otherwise. In the previous integral s is a signal;
In the previous expression b(vi) represents buyers I valuation of the object bid that wins the object and in
such a case vi represents bidders i reservation value. And the bidding strategy is strictly increasing function
of his reservation value, v represents the private values of the bidders, x represents private information that
buyer i has obtained about the objective monetary valuation of the object Fn-1(x) is buyers probability of win-
ning the lot, while Fn-1(v) represents a highest bid. In such a situation winning bid in general is given as:
b(v)= p(v)/Fn-1(v). In the previous expression p(v) represents expected payment which is equal to: 
p(v) = v Fn-1(v) - Fn-1(x) dx. If v*= v than in FPA and SPA, expected revenue is the same. That is
only the case if reservation price is zero. Otherwise the seller will always announce reservation price strict-
ly greater than his personal valuation i.e. v*>v, so : v*=v0 +1-      . Where v* is a minimum auction re -
ser vation value and below this reservation value is not worthwhile bidding, F(v*) is a probability function
66
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38) This is also known as Arrow–Pratt measure of relative risk aversion. See in (Carl&Blume1994)
39) This is also known as Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion.
40) See (Riley & Samuelson 1981)
 
 
.
that bidder with valuation F’(v*), will win the lot, and   is a first derivative of the probability function. By
rewriting and simplifying, we will find bidding function first, we will solve the integral:
Equation 18
Since signal s=v, Indefinite integral is                                     . So to solve definite integral one may apply:
Equation 19
In general solution to the definite integral is :
Equation 20
Bidding function in the risk averse case where a=0, and r is set is given as:
Equation 21
Or in general case for non-uniform distributions bidding function in FPA according to Krishna (2010) is given
as:
Equation 22
And F(y) = 1 - F(x) (F(x) is a CDF of a function ), x signal are drawn from private values distribution v so
xi = vi e
Now in the CRRA case, RRA coefficient can take values between zero and 1, utility is given as (c) = c1-a,
where a is the coefficient of RRA and a ∈ (0,1). Than the Nash-equilibrium bidding functions will have the
following form:
Equation 23
And bo < v < 1 or zero otherwise. 
One general Nash equilibrium biddingstrategy (CRRA case and where r=0) in FPA is given as:
Equation 24
And where r>0 i.e. auction is set with the reserve price bidding function is given as: 
67
CEA Journal of Economics
 
 and  
 
 
 
 
 
Equation 25
To solve this we find the indefinite integral solution (F (v)=v) which is :
Equation 26
Equation 27
Now to evaluate integral at the endpoints 
Equation 28
So the general bid function in this case when a>0 and r>0 is given s:
Equation 29
Equation 30
Or when reserve price and absolute coefficient of risk aversion is set:
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Namely if  than  
 
 
 
So  
 
If the coefficient of risk aversion is CARA (Constant absolute risk aversion),ie. 
, where , than the bidding function is given as: 
 
Equation 31
Where w presents wealth of the bidder.  Approximately wealth is approximated by his valuation of the object
which is subject to biding at the auction. 
All-pay auctions 
In all –pay auctions every bidder pays their bid whether they win or not. In all pay auctions Nash-equilibria
(in the case of risk neutrality) mixing strategies of the bidders means that expected sellers revenue is equal
to the common value of the prize,41 are approximately given by the expression:
Equation 32
Previous expression is valid for all b, if 0 ≤ b ≤ 100, in that expression F(b) also denotes c.d.f of the equi-
librium bidding strategy ; see (Gneezy&Smorodinsky 2006)
In general, in risk neutral case and there is no reserve price set bidding function for All-pay auctions is given
as:
Equation 33
Equation 34
i.e.  
Equation 35
in the case where CRRA coefficient  is being set bid function in APA auctions takes the following form:
Equation 36
If r>0 and a>0 i.e. there is RRA coefficient set and reserve price at the same
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41) See Baye et all (1996)
 
 
Or  where  denotes FPA bid-First price auction bid. If
the reserve price is set i.e. r>0 and bidders are risk neutral a=0 than the bidding
function in APA auctions is given as: 
 
 
 
Equation 37
In CARA case 
Equation 38
In general in the previous case with risk averse bidders, bidding functions are approximations the problem of
optimization is as follows (according to the software creator Richard M.Katzwer), consider an all pay auction
where n bidders draw IPV from some distribution with cdf on                 And let                                         denote
the symmetric Nash bid function. Bidders are risk averse with utility index u:   and initial wealth W. A bidder
tries to maximize:
Equation 39
The First order necessary condition (FONC)here is given as:
Equation 40
This is a complicated ODE to solve.
Expected revenue (expected payoffs in auctions)
In the first price auctions expected revenue for the auctioneer for every bid is given as expected payment
multiplied by the number of bidders n, i.e.:
Equation 41
is the expected payoff, where vi are independent private values, and revenue is given as:
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.
 
 
Or since  
 
 
 
Equation 42
When CRRA coefficient is being set i.e. when bidders are not risk neutral the corresponding expected pay-
offs (and corresponding revenue) of the bidders are given as:
Equation 43
Where   is CRRA coefficient in general when bids for the corresponding probabilities are known (calculated)
the expected payoffs (expected revenues for every bidder) are given as:
Equation 44
Equation 45
When reserve price is set in SPA auction, revenue function below reserve price looks like this:
Equation 46
While when independent private values exceed reserve price the functional form of revenue CDF looks same
as in the case with no reserve price. 
In all pay auctions in general case expected payoffs of the bidders are given as 
Equation 47
Expected revenue in APA is given as:
Equation 48
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In the previous expression  this is because .This is true 
also when reserve prices is set and coefficient of risk aversion. In the Second price 
auctions (SPA) the CDF of the revenue functions is calculated as
42
: 
 
 
 
 
42) See Kunimoto (2008)
 
 
From the revenue one need to find the private values function first and that is :
Equation 49
Results from auction solver 
Next, here are presented the results obtained by use of auction solver. Richard M.Katzwer wrote this soft-
ware. In the First table, we present the results obtained for the risk neutral case and in the second Table, we
provide results for the case of risk neutral bidders.43
Table 1 Risk neutral bidders, with reservation price zero, number of biiders=3
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43) CRRA and CARA are being used as measures of neutrality or aversity of bidders. 
Risk averse  case CRRA=0.4 ;CARA=4.0 and reservation price=0.4; number of bidders n=3  
Type of private 
values distribution 
Auction type 
maximum 
bid (right 
endpoint of 
bid 
distribution 
b_bar 
Expected 
revenue for 
the 
auctioneer 
(E[R] = 
E[m] * N) 
Expected 
payment by 
bidders 
E[m] 
Expected 
utility to 
bidders 
E[u 
probability 
item is 
unallocated 
(all bids below 
reserve) P0 
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type 
0.7346317 0.5233480      0.1744493 0.1028037 0.0943964 
SPA(Second price auction, 
English auction, Vickrey 
auction) 
1.0000000 0.4798612      0.1599537 0.1131171 0.0943964 
Standard normal  
(CRRA=0.4,r=0.4) 
APA(all-pay auctions) 0.7346317 0.0819876 0.0273292   
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type 
0.7263772 0.5102678 0.1700893 0.1534737 0.0943964 
SPA(Second price auction, 
English auction, Vickrey 
auction) 
1.0000000 0.4798612 0.1599537 0.1534737 0.0943964 
Standard normal 
(CARA=4.0,r=0.4) 
APA(all-pay auctions) 0.7263772 0.0756754 0.0252251   
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type 
0.8649665 0.7540914 0.2513638 0.0828988 0.0002989 
SPA(Second price auction, 
English auction, Vickrey 
auction) 
1.0000000 0.7077322 0.2359107 0.0966421 0.0002989 
Log normal  
(CRRA=0.4,r=0.4) 
APA(all-pay auctions) 0.8649665 0.1718317 0.0572772   
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type 
0.8384763 0.7290578 0.2430193 0.1297647 0.0002989 
SPA(Second price auction, 
English auction, Vickrey 
auction) 
1.0000000 0.7077322 0.2359107 0.1297647 0.0002989 
Log normal 
(CARA=4.0,r=0.4) 
APA(all-pay auctions) 0.8384763 0.1559933 0.0519978   
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.7735836 0.5761506 0.1920502 0.1036646 0.0640000 
SPA(Second price auction, 
English auction, Vickrey 
auction) 
1.0000000 0.5256000 0.1752000 0.1156296 0.0640000 
Beta 
(CRRA=0.4,r=0.4) 
APA(all-pay auctions)  0.7735836 0.1036405 0.0345468   
Next, in Table 2 are presented the results in the risk averse bidders case.
Table 2 Risk averse bidders (CRRA=4.0,CARA=4.0), with reservation price 0.4,number of bidders=3
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FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.7598812 0.5603228 0.1867743 0.1567281 0.0640000 
SPA(Second price auction, 
English auction, Vickrey 
auction) 
1.0000000 0.5256000 0.1752000 0.1567281 0.0640000 
Beta 
(CARA=4.0,r=0.4) 
APA(all-pay auctions)  0.7598812 0.0952758 0.0317586   
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.7735836 0.5761506 0.1920502 0.1042956 0.0640000 
SPA(Second price auction, 
English auction, Vickrey 
auction) 
1.0000000 0.5256000 0.1752000 0.1163464 0.0640000 
 
Uniform 
(CRRA=0.4,r=0.4) 
APA(all-pay auctions)  0.7735836 0.1036405 0.0345468   
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.7598812 0.5603228 0.1867743 0.1576778 0.0640000 
 
Uniform 
(CARA=4.0,r=0.4) 
SPA(Second price auction, 
English auction, Vickrey 
auction) 
1.0000000 0.5256000 0.1752000 0.1576778 0.0640000 
APA(all-pay auctions)  0.7598812 0.0952758 0.0317586   
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.6901554 0.5442205 0.1814068 0.0892794 0.0327680 
SPA(Second price auction, 
English auction, Vickrey 
auction) 
1.0000000 0.5077239 0.1692413 0.0997395 0.0327680 
 
Triangular 
(CRRA=0.4,r=0.4) 
APA(all-pay auctions)  0.6901554 0.0679635 0.0226545   
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.6722348 0.5252554 0.1750851 0.1349865 0.0327680 
SPA(Second price auction, 
English auction, Vickrey 
auction) 
1.0000000 0.5077239 0.1692413 0.1349865 0.0327680 
 
Triangular 
(CARA=4.0,r=0.4) 
APA(all-pay auctions)  0.6722348 0.0584859 0.0194953   
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.7372686 0.5892777 0.1964259 0.0925610 0.0255160 
SPA(Second price auction, 
English auction, Vickrey 
auction) 
1.0000000 0.5456206 0.1818735 0.1046092 0.0255160 
 
Kumaraswamy 
(CRRA=0.4,r=0.4) 
APA(all-pay auctions)  0.7372686 0.0912166 0.0304055   
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  0.7165197 0.5682720 0.1894240 0.1420239 0.0255160 
SPA(Second price auction, 
English auction, Vickrey 
auction) 
1.0000000 0.5456206 0.1818735 0.1420239 0.0255160 
 
Kumaraswamy 
(CARA=4.0,r=0.4) 
APA(all-pay auctions)  0.7165197 0.0799332 0.0266444   
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.5756602 0.2727609 0.0909203 0.0719515 0.4180305 
SPA(Second price auction, 
English auction, Vickrey 
auction) 
1.0000000 0.2592612 0.0864204 0.0748882 0.4180305 
 
Gamma 
(CRRA=0.4,r=0.4) 
APA(all-pay auctions)  0.5756602 0.0203123 0.0067708   
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  0.5922903 0.2713597 0.0904532 0.1018825 0.4156601 
SPA(Second price auction, 
English auction, Vickrey 
auction) 
1.0000000 0.2593647 0.0864549 0.1018825 0.4156601 
 
Gamma 
(CARA=4.0,r=0.4) 
APA(all-pay auctions)  0.5922903 0.0208872 0.0069624   
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.7011976 0.4704638 0.1568213 0.1001409 0.1418659 
SPA(Second price auction, 
English auction, Vickrey 
auction) 
1.0000000 0.4335800 0.1445267 0.1086913 0.1418659 
 
Weibull 
(CRRA=0.4,r=0.4) 
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FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.7011976 0.0651847 0.0217282 
  
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.6992714 0.4607301 0.1535767 0.1473960 0.1418659 
SPA(Second price auction, 
English auction, Vickrey 
auction) 
1.0000000 0.4335800 0.1445267 0.1473960 0.1418659 
 
Weibull 
(CARA=4.0,r=0.4) 
 
 
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.6992714 0.0610630 0.0203543   
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.6575730 0.3854263 0.1284754 0.0932573 0.2529822 
SPA(Second price auction, 
English auction, Vickrey 
auction) 
1.0000000 0.3578528 0.1192843 0.0992482 0.2529822 
 
Power 
(CRRA=0.4,r=0.4) 
 
 
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.6575730 0.0460285 0.0153428   
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.6666767 0.3811101 0.1270367 0.1344171 0.2529822 
 
Power 
(CARA=4.0,r=0.4) 
 
 
SPA(Second price auction, 
English auction, Vickrey 
auction) 
1.0000000 0.3578528 0.1192843 0.1344171 0.2529822 
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.6666767 0.0451887 0.0150629   
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.9139690 0.7795748 0.2598583 1.8465012 0.0114520 
SPA(Second price auction, 
English auction, Vickrey 
auction) 
1.0000000 0.7123353 0.2374451 Infinity 0.0114520 
 
Reverse Power 
(CRRA=0.4,r=0.4) 
 
 
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.9139690 0.2064959 0.0688320   
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.8877422 0.7553769 0.2517923 2.9094572 0.0114520 
SPA(Second price auction, 
English auction, Vickrey 
auction) 
1.0000000 0.7123353 0.2374451 Infinity 0.0114520 
 
Reverse Power 
(CARA=4.0,r=0.4) 
 
 
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.8877422 0.1904224 0.0634741   
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.7384851 0.5237630 0.1745877 0.1034777 0.0977777 
SPA(Second price auction, 
English auction, Vickrey 
auction) 
1.0000000 0.4796241 0.1598747 0.1138245 0.0977777 
 
Exponential  
(CRRA=0.4,r=0.4) 
 
 
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.7384851 0.0836569 0.0278856   
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.7305809 0.5111237 0.1703746 0.1543483 0.0977777 
SPA(Second price auction, 
English auction, Vickrey 
auction) 
1.0000000 0.4796241 0.1598747 0.1543483 0.0977777 
 
Exponential  
(CARA=4.0,r=0.4) 
 
 
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.7305809 0.0775855 0.0258618   
       
Conclusion
Hugo Sonnenschein, in his 1983 inaugural Nancy Schwartz Memorial Lecture, argued that is very important
to understand how incentives work, i.e. how to create institutional arrangements that induce individuals to
behave in certain way so that certain outcome prevails. In 1990s and later, economists have been recog-
nized to the design of several auction like mechanisms such as: US FCC spectrum auctions, 3G auctions in
Europe, the allocation of property rights on land at the airports, etc. So, the market design, or market archi-
tecture depends on a game theory, in particular games of incomplete information, but most important insights
come from auction theory, Menezes, Flavio, M. , Monteiro ,Paulo K.,(2008). Auction mechanism is also very
important since it is market clearing mechanism that equates supply and demand. In auctions price forma-
tion is explicit, i.e. the rules that determine price formation are well known to all parties involved. This paper
provided a theoretical insight how bids are formed in symmetric auctions case, in the three types of auctions
FPA, SPA, APA. 
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Appendix 1. Distributions in Auction solver software 
Standard Normal distribution function  
In this case  is cumulative distribution, than standard normal function with CDF 
 (  and    z is standardized normal value ;in this 
case of standard normal distribution z=x) given as : 
 
In our case we used standard normal distribution function where  and  
and  and .So this gives : 
 
Also  is the lowest boundary of support where F=0 , and  is the highest 
boundary of support where F=1.   Also,  this is a cumulative function of a 
distribution .This CDF should be differentiable and strictly increasing  function on 
some interval  is a subset form points in the interval .And,  is the 
probability density function of a distribution, that is derivative of cumulative 
distribution function  . 
 
since in our case  and  we can simplify the previous expression as: 
 
Inverse function of the CDF is given as: 
    or in our case: 
 
Log normal distribution  
In this distribution  is a location parameter and it should be  , and   this is a 
scale parameter, and  and   parameters should be points drawn as subset for the set 
of real numbers 
, than CDF of the function would be: 
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in our case   but  so the last expression can be simplified as: 
 
And the probability density function given as: 
 or in our case: 
   and z=x also could be simplified in the last 
expression.  
Beta distribution  
In the Beta distribution it should be   so in our case  (uniform 
distribution) our distribution support values between 0 and 1, 
support=[0.000,1.000].The Beta function is a power function on x and its reflection 1-
x , and it is defined as: 
 
And CDF of this function can be written as: 
  where  
PDF of the function is given as: 
 
With  our Beta distribution turns into standard uniform distribution  
 
Uniform distribution  
In the uniform distribution  and in our case this distributions is 
supported in the range [0,1].Cumulative distribution function for uniform distribution 
is given as: 
 
Probability distribution function is given as: 
 
Inverse function is given as: 
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Triangular distribution  
In our case in the triangular distribution parameters were set as follows: , , 
and .Requirement here is that .Also   this is parameter of 
uniformity (vertex-common endpoint of two or more rays of line segments). In our 
case .  
Cumulative distribution function here is: 
        for   or 
  for  
In our case since , , and  this  distribution is a distribution of 
, and  are two independent random variables. So previous expression 
in our case would become: 
             if         or   
  and for the part  it becomes 
 
 
4x-(4x 
Probability distribution function or PDF is a first derivative of the CDF so  
 
 
 
Kumaraswamy or double bounded distribution  
In our case for Kumaraswamy distribution lower and upper bound are  and 
 and  
. Requirement fulfilled here is that , and .The CDF 
of the Kumaraswamy distribution is defined as: 
 
And the probability density function is a first derivative of the previous expression: 
   , for  and  
Gamma distribution  
In our case shape parameter in this distribution  and scale parameter  
and  so distribution support is . The Gamma 
function is defined as: 
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  (this is also called lower incomplete Gamma 
function) 
CDF of Gamma distribution is given as: 
  or CDF is given as 
 
While the probability density function is given as : 
 
Or in terms of shape parameter k and scale parameter b, PDF of Gamma distribution 
can be written as: 
    or if we simplify: 
 
  in our case where k=0.5, b=1 the last expression would 
become: 
First  
 
 
Weibull distribution  
This is continuous probability distribution. In our case  and  and  
which means that the failure rate is constant over time, and  this is the scale 
parameter .And after the Rayleigh distribution  since in our case 
 and  . Cumulative distribution function of Weibull distribution 
is given as: 
  or alternatively  
 
Probability density function is given as: 
 
Uniform distribution   
This distribution is  in our case a=0, b=1, this are minimal and maximal value. 
This distribution supports  . 
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So CDF of a uniform distribution is: 
 
PDF of uniform distribution is given as: 
 
 
Power distribution  
This is distribution that is frequently used to model income, financial variables and 
others. In our case  .CDF of this distribution
1
 is given as: 
 
PDF of this distribution is given as: 
 
In the previous expressions  
Reverse power distribution  
Parameters are the same as in power distribution namely  . And 
also , and  this is a shape parameter.  
CDF of this probability distribution is given as: 
 
PDF of this distribution is given as: 
 
Exponential distribution  
In our case parameters are set as  and  and  .CDF of this 
probability distribution is given as: 
 
PDF of this distribution is given as: 
 
 
Appendix Parametrized distributions in auction solver 
                                                 
1
See, Katzwer (2011) 
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